14th Amendment — Due Process
No state shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor deny equal protection (Amend. XIV, § 1).
The laws that decide whether a parent can be jailed for child support they cannot pay, whether they get a lawyer, and what happens when the other parent blocks their time with their child — first at the federal level, then in all 50 states and DC.
Under Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431 (2011) and Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983), a court may not jail a parent for nonpayment without first determining ability to pay and willfulness. Turner himself was jailed 12 months over $5,728.76 in arrears with no ability-to-pay finding — the Supreme Court held that jailing violated due process. Turner does not forbid jail. It forbids jail without an ability-to-pay inquiry.
Turner also held there is no automatic right to appointed counsel in civil contempt when the other parent is unrepresented — but the state must provide these four safeguards instead:
Notice that your ability to pay is the critical issue at the hearing.
A form (or equivalent) to lay out your financial information.
A chance to respond to questions and statements about your finances.
An express finding by the judge that you have the ability to pay.
Federal regulation backs this up: 45 C.F.R. § 303.6(c)(4) (2016 Final Rule, effective 19 Jan 2017) requires every Title IV-D agency to screen for ability to pay before seeking civil contempt, give that information to the court, and give the parent clear notice. Source: civil.sog.unc.edu · Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431
The statutes and cases that shape every family court in the country.
14th Amendment — Due Process
No state shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor deny equal protection (Amend. XIV, § 1).
Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660
A court may not revoke probation or imprison someone for failure to pay a fine or restitution without evidence and findings that the failure was willful, or that the person failed to make sufficient bona fide efforts and alternatives are inadequate. “If the probationer has made all reasonable bona fide efforts to pay … yet cannot do so through no fault of his own, it is fundamentally unfair to revoke probation automatically.”
Source: caselaw.findlaw.com
Title IV-D, Social Security Act — 42 U.S.C. §§ 651–669b
Enacted 1975. A federal–state partnership: every state must have an approved plan (42 U.S.C. § 654) and a single IV-D agency to locate parents, establish paternity, obtain and enforce support orders. The federal government pays 66% of eligible administrative costs (42 U.S.C. § 655), plus performance incentives based on collections and cost-effectiveness (45 C.F.R. § 305.2). Required state tools include income withholding, tax-refund offset, licence suspension, liens, credit reporting, passport denial, and contempt (42 U.S.C. § 666). All 50 states, DC, Guam, Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands operate programmes.
Sources: congress.gov (CRS) · nctreasurer.gov
Deadbeat Parents Punishment Act — 18 U.S.C. § 228
Created by the Child Support Recovery Act of 1992; felony tiers added in 1998. Misdemeanour: willfully failing to pay support for a child in another state, unpaid over 1 year or over $5,000 — up to 6 months. Felony: travelling interstate with intent to evade (over 1 year / $5,000), or willful nonpayment over 2 years or over $10,000 — up to 2 years. Restitution of arrears is mandatory at sentencing.
Source: congress.gov
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act — 28 U.S.C. § 1738A
Every state must enforce another state's custody or visitation order made consistently with the Act, and must not modify it except as the Act allows (§ 1738A(a)). An order is consistent only if the issuing court had jurisdiction under state law and a listed basis is met — principally the child's home state: where the child lived with a parent for at least 6 consecutive months immediately before proceedings (from birth if under 6 months). Jurisdiction continues while the state remains the residence of the child or any contestant (§ 1738A(d)).
Source: uscode.house.gov
UCCJEA — custody jurisdiction & enforcement
The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (1997) conforms state jurisdiction rules to the PKPA and adds enforcement: registration and expedited enforcement of out-of-state custody orders, and communication between courts. Adopted by 49 states, DC, Guam, Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. The only state that has not adopted it is Massachusetts, which follows its own Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, M.G.L. c. 209B — substantially similar in effect. Each state codifies it separately (e.g. N.J.S.A. 2A:34-53 et seq.; N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law art. 5-A; Tex. Fam. Code ch. 152; Cal. Fam. Code §§ 3400–3465; Fla. Stat. §§ 61.501–61.542; N.C. Gen. Stat. ch. 50A).
Source: Cornell Law Institute. Note: a secondary source reports the Massachusetts Senate passed the UCCJEA in July 2025 but the House did not pass it by year-end — not verified from a primary source.
UIFSA + 28 U.S.C. § 1738B
The Uniform Interstate Family Support Act creates a one-order system: one controlling support order, continuing exclusive jurisdiction in the issuing state, and registration for enforcement in other states. Adopted by all 50 states, DC, Guam, Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands — Congress made adoption a condition of IV-D funding (42 U.S.C. § 666(f)). The federal companion, the Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act (1994), 28 U.S.C. § 1738B, independently requires states to honour valid sister-state support orders.
Source: congress.gov (CRS)
Servicemembers Civil Relief Act — 50 U.S.C. §§ 3901–4043
Protects active-duty servicemembers from civil prejudice due to service. § 3931: the court must appoint counsel before entering a default against an absent servicemember. § 3932: on proper application showing service materially affects the ability to appear, the court must stay proceedings for at least 90 days; further stays are possible. Limitation periods are tolled during service.
Source: tampamilitarydivorcelawyers.com
Indian Child Welfare Act — 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1963
Minimum federal standards for foster-care placement, termination of parental rights, and adoptive placements involving an “Indian child” (§ 1903). Under § 1911, the tribe has exclusive jurisdiction over a child residing or domiciled on the reservation; for off-reservation children, state court must transfer to tribal court on petition absent objection by either parent or good cause. § 1912 sets heightened burdens, including active efforts to prevent the breakup of the family.
Source: govinfo.gov. Note: the research cites Haaland v. Brackeen, 599 U.S. 255 (2023) as upholding ICWA, but that citation was not independently verified in the research.
Alimony & child support after the 2017 tax law
For divorce or separation instruments executed after 31 Dec 2018, alimony is no longer deductible by the payer and no longer taxable to the recipient (26 U.S.C. § 215 / § 71, as amended by the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act). Instruments from on or before 31 Dec 2018 keep the old rule unless later modified to expressly adopt the new one. Child support has always been tax-neutral — never deductible, never taxable, regardless of date (IRS Topic No. 452 / Publication 504).
Source: legalclarity.org (citing IRS Topic 452)
International Parental Kidnapping Crime Act — 18 U.S.C. § 1204
A federal felony to remove a child under 16 from the United States, or retain a child outside the U.S., with intent to obstruct the lawful exercise of parental rights.
42 U.S.C. § 1983
A civil action against a person acting under colour of state law who deprives another of federal constitutional rights. Not a family-law statute, but the vehicle parents sometimes use to challenge systemic practices — Pasqua (New Jersey, below) began in federal court.
Title IV-D pays states ~66% of administrative costs plus performance incentives. UIFSA gives every support order a one-order system enforceable nationwide, backed by income withholding, licence suspension, passport denial and tax-refund offset.
There is no federal funding, no agency, and no interstate enforcement scheme for parenting-time or custody-access orders. They are enforced state by state — mainly by contempt and makeup time — under only the PKPA/UCCJEA jurisdiction rules.
That gap is a structural fact of how the laws were written — and it is why a missed payment triggers a system, while a missed weekend triggers a motion the parent must file and fund themselves.
The cases parents invoke — what they actually hold, and what they don't.
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
Liberty under the Due Process Clause includes the right “to marry, establish a home and bring up children.” The Court struck down a law banning teaching in a language other than English.
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
“The child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.” Struck down a compulsory public-school law.
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 65
“The interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children — is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.” A Washington law letting any person petition for visitation at any time on a best-interests test was unconstitutional as applied to a fit mother; courts must give “special weight” to a fit parent's decision. It was a plurality decision — no majority opinion on the full scope of the right.
Sources: oag.state.tx.us · lambdalegal.org
The right is fundamental — not absolute
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) requires clear-and-convincing evidence to terminate parental rights; Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) recognises parents generally may make medical decisions for their children. Together they show the state may intervene on proof of unfitness or harm, under heightened standards.
Same federal floor everywhere. Very different ground on top of it.
Florida presumes present ability from the original order and makes the parent prove inability to purge (§ 61.14(5)). California and Texas make inability an affirmative defence the parent must prove — Texas requires all four elements of Fam. Code § 157.008, including failed attempts to borrow. Pennsylvania's Supreme Court in 2026 required proof beyond a reasonable doubt of present ability to pay a purge (Lebanon County, J-40-2025 — a plurality/concurrence split; check for a settled majority rule). North Carolina requires findings of willfulness and present ability (G.S. 5A-21).
The same unemployed parent is far more likely to be jailed in a presumption state than in a burden-on-petitioner state.
Guaranteed: New Jersey (Pasqua) and New York (statute, Family Court Act § 262). Expressly not guaranteed: Georgia and South Carolina — and a 2017 law-review survey found 20 states + DC do not appoint counsel in civil support contempt. Unsettled: Pennsylvania (2026 litigation ongoing). Not verified for 40+ other jurisdictions — there is no national counsel right in civil support contempt, and this page does not claim one. Criminal nonsupport is different everywhere: the Sixth Amendment guarantees counsel there.
A first in-state withholding can be a misdemeanour (Georgia; South Dakota first offence; Ohio; New York 2nd degree) — while the same conduct taken out of state or prolonged becomes a felony in most states: up to 10 years in New Jersey (2nd degree) and Alabama (Class C), a state-jail felony in Texas, 3rd-degree felonies in Florida and Pennsylvania. Some states had no general in-state interference crime at all in the 2004 compilation (North Carolina, North Dakota, South Carolina, Mississippi — interstate-only statutes), so an in-state withholding there is handled only by civil contempt and makeup time.
New Jersey routes almost everything through Probation Division hearings on a Motion to Enforce Litigant's Rights (R. 1:10-3). Texas uses a single Motion for Enforcement under Fam. Code ch. 157. New York splits between Family Court violation petitions and Supreme Court contempt motions. North Carolina proceeds by show-cause order under ch. 5A. Filing the wrong vehicle can delay or defeat enforcement — and the correct name was verified only for the ten deep-dive states below.
Statutes and contempt are only part of a case. These are the other doctrines that decide custody, support, and enforcement — with the governing authority for each. Topics added beyond the original research are marked where a point could not be verified to a primary source.
Best interest of the child — factor lists
Every state decides custody by the child's best interest, and most list the factors by statute. New Jersey (N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(c)) weighs, among others: the parents' ability to communicate and cooperate; any history of unwillingness to allow parenting time not based on substantiated abuse; the child's safety; stability of education; sibling bonds; and the child's own preference if of sufficient age and capacity. Pennsylvania (23 Pa.C.S. § 5328(a)) lists its factors and, since Kayden's Law (Act 8 of 2024), requires substantial weighted consideration of the safety factors — which parent is more likely to keep the child safe, present and past abuse, child-abuse/protective-services history, and violent or assaultive behavior; attempts to turn the child against the other parent are also an express factor. California weighs health, safety and welfare plus any history of abuse and habitual drug/alcohol use (Fam. Code § 3011), under a stated policy favouring frequent and continuing contact with both parents (§ 3020).
Sources: 23 Pa.C.S. § 5328 text (Adams County, PA) · N.J.S.A. 9:2-4 (see relocation source below)
Relocation / move-away cases
Moving a child over the other parent's objection almost always requires consent or a court order. New Jersey: N.J.S.A. 9:2-2 bars removing a child from the state without consent or an order “upon cause shown,” and Bisbing v. Bisbing, 230 N.J. 309 (2017) holds that cause is decided by the child's best interests under the N.J.S.A. 9:2-4 factors — replacing the older, easier Baures good-faith test. Pennsylvania has a dedicated relocation procedure and factor list (23 Pa.C.S. § 5337), including formal notice to the other parent. Other states split between best-interest tests, burden-shifting frameworks, and notice statutes — the specific test in the remaining states was not verified in this research.
Sources: einhornlawyers.com (Bisbing) · divorcenet.com
Modification — changed circumstances
Orders are not freely re-openable. New Jersey: under Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139 (1980), support orders remain modifiable under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 on a showing of changed circumstances — the moving party must first make a prima facie showing; only then does the court order full financial discovery and, if material facts are disputed, a plenary hearing. The change must be substantial and not merely temporary. Custody and parenting time are likewise modifiable on a substantial change affecting the child's best interests. Federal limit on support: the Bradley Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(9), makes each payment a judgment when due and generally bars retroactive modification of arrears (stated from secondary sources in the underlying research — verify the text before citing in a filing). States phrase the threshold differently (e.g. “material and substantial change”) — state-by-state wording outside NJ was not verified.
Source: lyndahinkle.com (Lepis)
Discovery & evidence — texts, posts, hearsay
Cases are won on admissible proof. General frameworks (state rules mirror these closely, but check your state's rules): hearsay — an out-of-court statement offered for its truth is inadmissible unless an exception applies (cf. Fed. R. Evid. 801–807); a parent's own texts are usually analysable as statements of a party-opponent, while a child's out-of-court statements face hearsay limits and, in many states, special child-hearsay statutes. Authentication — screenshots and messages must be shown to be what they claim to be (cf. Fed. R. Evid. 901): keep originals, metadata, and the full thread, not cropped excerpts. Discovery — financial disclosure (tax returns, pay records, bank statements) is routinely compelled in support cases; in New Jersey the Case Information Statement is the standard vehicle. Social-media posts are discoverable and admissible on the same rules as any other evidence — and are routinely used on credibility, income, and parenting time.
Note: framed on the Federal Rules of Evidence as the common model; your state's evidence code and any child-hearsay statute were not verified state-by-state in this research.
Custody evaluations & expert witnesses
Courts may order custody evaluations by psychologists or other professionals, and parties may retain their own experts. Expert testimony must clear a reliability gate — Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993) in federal court and states following it; some states retain the Frye general-acceptance test. Evaluators typically interview both parents and the child, observe parent–child interaction, review records, and report against the statutory best-interest factors. An evaluation is evidence, not a verdict — attorneys cross-examine evaluators on method, data, and bias like any other expert.
Guardians ad litem & parenting coordinators
A guardian ad litem (GAL) is appointed to investigate and report on the child's best interest; in some states a separate attorney represents the child's own expressed wishes — the two roles are not the same and are defined by state law. A parenting coordinator is a neutral appointed (or agreed) to help high-conflict parents implement an existing order day-to-day — scheduling disputes, exchanges, minor decisions — without returning to court for every fight. Coordinator authority, GAL qualifications, and who pays are all set by state statute or court rule.
Mediation & alternative dispute resolution
Most states require or strongly encourage mediation of custody and parenting-time disputes before trial, and many court systems run their own programmes. The Uniform Mediation Act (2001) — adopted in a minority of states (exact current count not verified) — supplies confidentiality and privilege rules where enacted; elsewhere, mediation confidentiality comes from state statute, court rule, or the mediation agreement itself. Agreements reached in mediation generally become binding only when reduced to a court order. Domestic-violence screening and opt-outs exist in most court-annexed programmes because mediation presumes both parties can negotiate safely.
Domestic violence & protective orders
Protective orders change custody law immediately. California model: on a finding that a parent perpetrated domestic violence within the previous five years, Fam. Code § 3044 creates a rebuttable presumption that awarding that parent sole or joint custody is detrimental to the child — rebuttable only by a preponderance of the evidence, with statutory factors including completion of a batterer's programme, and the frequent-contact policy may not be used to rebut it. Many states have analogous presumptions or mandatory custody factors for abuse (the list varies and was not verified state-by-state). Federal: 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) bars firearm possession by a person subject to a qualifying intimate-partner protective order — upheld in United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024). Federal law also requires full faith and credit for protection orders across state lines (18 U.S.C. § 2265).
Sources: leginfo.legislature.ca.gov (Fam. Code § 3044) · everytown.org (Rahimi)
Paternity & parentage
Support and custody rights both start with legal parentage. The Supreme Court has long protected unwed fathers who grasp the opportunity to parent (Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972)) while allowing states to set reasonable procedures for asserting those rights. Modern practice runs on voluntary acknowledgments of paternity (given the force of a judgment under federal law, 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)), genetic testing, and the Uniform Parentage Act (1973; revised 2000 and 2017), adopted in some form by many states (current adoption map not verified). Establishing paternity is a core Title IV-D function — and a prerequisite to support, custody, and inheritance rights alike.
Grandparents' & third-party rights
After Troxel (above), every state's grandparent-visitation statute must give “special weight” to a fit parent's decision. States respond differently: New Jersey requires a grandparent to prove by a preponderance that visitation is necessary to avoid particular, identifiable harm to the child (N.J.S.A. 9:2-7.1 as read in Moriarty v. Bradt, 177 N.J. 84 (2003)). Other states use best-interest tests with standing limits (death of a parent, divorce, or an established bond). The threshold test in each state was not verified beyond New Jersey.
Deployment & custody
Beyond the SCRA (Part 1), deployment custody is governed state by state. The Uniform Deployed Parents Custody and Visitation Act (Uniform Law Commission, 2012) provides for temporary delegation of custodial responsibility during deployment, expedited hearings, and termination of the temporary order after return; Pennsylvania became the 18th state to adopt it in October 2025 (Act 40 of 2025), and adoption remains partial nationally. Many non-adopting states have their own deployment statutes barring permanent custody changes based solely on deployment.
Guidelines & deviations
Federal law requires every state to maintain one set of presumptive child-support guidelines and to review them at least every four years (45 C.F.R. § 302.56; 42 U.S.C. § 667). States choose the model — most use income shares, some a percentage-of-income formula — and all allow deviation for stated reasons (extraordinary medical or educational needs, shared-custody time, other children, and similar), which must be supported by written findings. Income can be imputed to a parent found voluntarily unemployed or underemployed.
Source: Cornell LII (45 C.F.R. § 302.56)
Arrears: intercepts, licences, passports
The IV-D toolkit (42 U.S.C. § 666) escalates: income withholding (the default, § 666(b)); federal tax-refund offset for past-due support (42 U.S.C. § 664); licence suspension — states must have procedures to suspend driver's, professional, and recreational licences of parents who owe overdue support or fail to comply with a warrant/subpoena (§ 666(a)(16)); passport denial — on state certification that arrears exceed $2,500, the Secretary of State must refuse to issue a passport and may revoke an existing one (42 U.S.C. § 652(k)); plus liens and credit-bureau reporting. Arrears generally cannot be retroactively reduced (Bradley Amendment, § 666(a)(9)) — but prospective modification and ability-to-pay defences remain available.
Attorney's fees & fee-shifting
The default “American rule” — each side pays its own lawyer — is heavily modified in family law. Many states authorise need-based fee awards so the lower-earning spouse can litigate on a level field (e.g. California Fam. Code §§ 2030–2034), and most allow fees as a sanction for non-compliance or bad-faith conduct — New Jersey's enforcement rule, R. 5:3-7, expressly includes counsel fees among the remedies for violating a parenting-time or support order, and contempt findings routinely carry the other side's fees in the deep-dive states below.
Appeals
Family-court appeals are narrow by design: appeals usually lie only from final orders (temporary orders are reviewed only by leave or emergency application in most systems), deadlines are short and jurisdictional (e.g. 45 days in New Jersey, R. 2:4-1), and custody findings are reviewed for abuse of discretion — the appellate court defers to the trial judge's credibility findings and reverses mainly for legal error, a factor the judge failed to address, or findings unsupported by the record. An appeal does not automatically stay enforcement; a stay must be separately sought.
Note: stated at the level of general U.S. appellate practice with the New Jersey rule as the example; each state's deadline and standard were not verified state-by-state.
Self-represented pitfalls
Courts hold self-represented litigants to the same rules as attorneys. The failures attorneys see most: filing the wrong motion (see “Biggest differences” #4); missing service and notice requirements, so the motion is never heard; skipping required financial forms, so support cannot be set or modified; asking for retroactive relief the law forbids; treating a hearing as a conversation instead of making a record (exhibits marked, findings requested); and missing appeal deadlines. The judge must stay neutral — the judge cannot be your lawyer.
Tap a state for its contempt rule, counsel rule, interference law, and the exact name of the enforcement filing.
Three routes to incarceration for refusing a support order (Directive #07-23, 15 May 2023): (1) Relief to Litigant, R. 1:10-3 / R. 5:3-7 — the usual route; Probation brings the case, a Child Support Hearing Officer makes findings on non-compliance and ability to pay, and a judge orders any coercive incarceration with a purge amount within the parent's ability to pay. (2) Contempt, R. 1:10-2 — punitive, rare for support. (3) Criminal prosecution for nonsupport, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-5. Before coercive incarceration the court must find the parent was capable of providing the support but willfully refused (Pasqua, 186 N.J. at 141 n.2). Directive #07-23 requires findings on indigence and ability to pay on the CS702 order, and treats the 72 hours after a bench-warrant arrest as a maximum — every effort must be made to hold the hearing by close of the next business day.
Yes — guaranteed. Pasqua v. Council, 186 N.J. 127 (2006): the Fourteenth Amendment and N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 1 require appointed counsel for indigent parents facing incarceration at ability-to-pay/enforcement hearings. Turner did not overrule Pasqua — New Jersey cases are brought by the Probation Division (the State, represented), the situation Turner expressly reserved.
N.J.S.A. 2C:13-4: 3rd-degree crime, 3–5 years / up to $15,000; 2nd-degree, 5–10 years / up to $150,000 if the child is taken outside the United States or for more than 24 hours. Also N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9 (contempt of a court order, 4th degree, up to 18 months / $10,000). Civil remedies under R. 1:10-3 + R. 5:3-7 include makeup parenting time, sanctions, counsel fees, modification, and coercive incarceration.
Motion to Enforce Litigant's Rights (R. 1:10-3), often with R. 5:3-7 relief.
Note: pending bill A6261 (introduced Dec 2025) would create graduated penalties for 2C:13-4 — it is not law. Source: njcourts.gov (Directive #07-23)
Family Court Act § 454: on a finding of willful failure to obey a support order, the court may commit the parent to jail up to 6 months; failure to pay as ordered is prima facie evidence of willfulness. The court must also enter a money judgment and may order income deduction, sequestration, licence suspension, and counsel fees. In Supreme Court divorce cases, Dom. Rel. Law § 245 requires exhaustion of other enforcement first, and § 246(3) makes financial inability a defence with an evidentiary hearing on ability to pay.
Yes — by statute. Family Court Act § 262 and County Law art. 18-B expressly include “any person charged with contempt of court for violation of a prior court order (including willful violation of a child support order).”
Penal Law § 135.45 (2nd degree): Class A misdemeanour, up to 364 days. § 135.50 (1st degree): Class E felony, up to 4 years (out-of-state removal with intent to remove permanently, or endangering the child). Civil: violation/enforcement petition — makeup time, fees, contempt, modification.
Violation petition (Family Court) or motion for contempt under Dom. Rel. Law § 245 (Supreme Court). UCCJEA: Dom. Rel. Law art. 5-A.
Sources: nysenate.gov (FCA § 454) · ils.ny.gov
23 Pa.C.S. § 4345: willful failure to comply — contempt up to 6 months, $1,000 fine, and/or up to 1 year probation, with a stated purge condition. Pa.R.Civ.P. 1910.25 requires the petition to tell the parent ability to pay is a critical issue; Rule 1910.25-5 bars incarceration without an evidentiary hearing and a finding on present ability to pay. Barrett v. Barrett, 368 A.2d 616 (Pa. 1977): inability plus good-faith effort defeats contempt. March 2026: in Appeal of Lebanon County, No. J-40-2025, an opinion announcing the judgment vacated a 100-day term where the agency had not proved beyond a reasonable doubt the parent's present ability to pay a $2,000 purge — very recent, and a plurality/concurrence posture; check for a settled majority rule before relying on the burden formulation.
Contested / not definitively verified. A 2011 amicus brief states Pennsylvania's Supreme Court has recognised a right to counsel where imprisonment is faced, but Sawyer v. Anusionwu, 2026 PA Super 83, was still litigating appointment/waiver issues from a March 2025 hearing. Do not assert a guarantee without checking the latest authority.
18 Pa.C.S. § 2904: 3rd-degree felony; § 2909 covers concealment of a child's whereabouts. Civil custody contempt, 23 Pa.C.S. § 5323(g): up to 6 months, $500, probation, licence suspension, counsel fees.
Petition for Civil Contempt (Pa.R.Civ.P. 1910.25) for support; Petition for Contempt under § 5323(g) for custody.
Tex. Fam. Code ch. 157: enforcement in the court of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction (§ 157.001), with at least 10 days' personal-service notice (§ 157.062). Inability is an affirmative defence the parent must prove (§ 157.008(c), by a preponderance, § 157.006(b)) — all four elements: (1) lacked ability to pay the amount ordered, (2) lacked property that could be sold, mortgaged or pledged, (3) attempted unsuccessfully to borrow, and (4) knew of no source of money (Ex parte Roosth, 881 S.W.2d 300 (Tex. 1994)). Contempt: Tex. Gov't Code § 21.002 — up to $500 per violation and/or county jail up to 6 months.
Not verified for civil support contempt; criminal contempt triggers Sixth Amendment counsel. Do not assert a Texas civil-contempt counsel guarantee.
Tex. Penal Code § 25.03: state jail felony, 180 days–2 years / up to $10,000; a defence exists for return within 3 days (§ 25.03(c)). Caution: SB 2794 (2026), a proposed three-strikes escalation, died in the House and never became law. Civil: Motion for Enforcement of a possession order — makeup possession, clarifying order, contempt, fees; writ of habeas corpus for prompt return.
Motion for Enforcement (Tex. Fam. Code § 157.001).
Under Code Civ. Proc. § 1209.5, proof of a valid order, knowledge, and noncompliance is prima facie evidence of contempt — ability to pay is not an element. Moss v. Superior Court (Ortiz), 17 Cal.4th 396 (1998): inability is an affirmative defence the parent must prove by a preponderance — and a parent whose inability comes from a willful failure to seek or accept available work matching their skills may still be held in contempt. Contempt starts with Form FL-410; each month of nonpayment is a separate count, with a 3-year limitations period (§ 1218.5).
Criminal contempt (Penal Code § 166(a)(4)) carries full criminal rights including counsel. Civil contempt follows Turner — no automatic appointed counsel where the other party is unrepresented and safeguards are provided.
Penal Code § 278 (child abduction, no right to custody): up to 1 year county jail / $1,000, or 2, 3 or 4 years / $10,000. § 278.5 (depriving a lawful custodian or visitation): up to 1 year / $1,000, or 16 months / 2 / 3 years / $10,000. Civil: Request for Order (FL-300) plus Fam. Code § 3028 compensation for thwarted time (including childcare costs) and compensatory parenting time; § 271 sanctions and fees.
Order to Show Cause and Affidavit for Contempt (FL-410) for support; Request for Order (FL-300) for custody enforcement.
Sources: law.justia.com (Moss) · leginfo.legislature.ca.gov (Penal Code)
Fla. Stat. § 61.14(5)(a): the original order creates a presumption of present ability to pay and purge, and the parent bears the burden of proving lack of ability. Bowen v. Bowen, 471 So.2d 1274 (Fla. 1985): no jailing for civil contempt without a finding of present ability to pay the purge. Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.615 requires a hearing within 48 hours of arrest on a writ of bodily attachment (§ 61.11).
Not verified for civil support contempt — Florida follows Turner's safeguards model; criminal cases carry counsel.
Fla. Stat. § 787.03: 3rd-degree felony, up to 5 years / $5,000 — including where no custody order yet exists, if done with malicious intent to deprive the other parent. Civil: § 61.13(4)(c) — on a finding of refusal to honour time-sharing without proper cause, the court must award makeup time-sharing as quickly as possible at the noncompliant parent's expense, and may add fees, sanctions, and modification. Withholding time-sharing over unpaid support is not lawful (§ 61.13(4)(a)).
Motion for Civil Contempt and Enforcement (Fla. Fam. L. Form 12.960). Florida says “time-sharing / parenting plan,” not custody/visitation.
Source: leg.state.fl.us (§ 61.14)
Ohio Rev. Code §§ 2705.02, 2705.05, 2705.031: contempt penalties escalate — 1st offence up to 30 days / $250; 2nd up to 60 days / $500; 3rd and later up to 90 days / $1,000. Ohio Admin. Code 5101:12-50-50 codifies the federal Turner screening rule: the child support agency must screen for ability to pay, give the court that information, and give clear notice that ability to pay is the critical question.
Not verified for civil support contempt.
Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.23: 1st-degree misdemeanour; 5th-degree felony in the aggravated/interstate form. Criminal nonsupport, § 2919.21: 1st-degree misdemeanour, or 5th-degree felony (6–12 months) with a prior conviction or 26 weeks of nonsupport in any 104. Civil: motion for contempt; makeup/compensatory time is available on a custody violation — a specific makeup-time statute was not verified.
Motion for Contempt (Ohio Rev. Code § 2705.031 and local domestic-relations forms).
750 ILCS 5/505(b): nonpayment must be willful despite ability to pay; inability (disability, job loss, incarceration) is a defence the parent must prove. After a contempt finding the court may order probation or periodic imprisonment up to 6 months with work release — jail that still lets the parent earn, with earnings applicable to arrears.
Not verified for civil support contempt.
720 ILCS 5/10-5 (child abduction): Class 4 felony. (The related parenting-time interference provision, 720 ILCS 5/10-5.5, was not verified in this research.) Criminal nonsupport, 750 ILCS 16/15: Class A misdemeanour (up to 1 year) where arrears exceed $5,000 or nonpayment exceeds 6 months and the parent has ability to pay.
Petition for Rule to Show Cause / Petition for Contempt; fees under 750 ILCS 5/508.
Source: ilga.gov (750 ILCS 5/505)
O.C.G.A. § 19-6-28: support contempt is handled within the existing case (no new filing fee); the court decides whether the failure was willful, and may impose fines, a purge payment schedule, incarceration, and fees. § 19-6-28.1 permits licence suspension only after considering ability and willingness to comply. (Georgia detail rests partly on a secondary source in the research — verify the current text of §§ 19-6-28 / 19-6-28.1.)
No guaranteed appointed counsel in civil support contempt — parents rely on Turner safeguards. Georgia jailed roughly 3,500 parents for nonsupport in 2010 (2017 law-review survey).
O.C.G.A. § 16-5-45: misdemeanour; felony on a 3rd conviction (2004 compilation — verify current grading). Civil: motion for contempt; fees under § 19-6-2.
Motion for Contempt (O.C.G.A. § 19-6-28).
Sources: legalclarity.org · thefreelibrary.com (Revisiting Turner)
N.C. Gen. Stat. ch. 5A: civil contempt exists only to coerce compliance the court finds the parent presently able to perform (or able to take reasonable measures to perform); the failure must be willful, and the order must state a purge condition the parent can actually perform — the parent “holds the keys to the jail.” Imprisonment runs until compliance, with de novo recommitment review at 90 days and a 1-year maximum for child support. Cases: Walters v. Walters, 307 N.C. 381 (1983); Reynolds v. Reynolds, 356 N.C. 287 (2002).
Not verified — University of North Carolina materials note counsel in criminal contempt but leave the civil-contempt position ambiguous; do not assert a guarantee.
N.C.G.S. § 14-320.1: transporting or keeping a child under 16 outside North Carolina to violate a custody order — Class I felony. It is interstate only; the 2004 compilation lists no general in-state interference crime for North Carolina. Civil: motion for contempt (§§ 5A-23, 50-13.3); makeup time and modification are available — a specific makeup-time statute was not verified.
Motion for Order to Show Cause / Motion for Contempt (N.C.G.S. §§ 5A-23, 50-13.9).
The criminal interference statute for every state, its penalty class, and the counsel position in support-contempt cases. For every state, the federal Turner/Bearden floor and 45 C.F.R. § 303.6 apply regardless of what is marked “not verified.”
Drawn directly from Turner v. Rogers and 45 C.F.R. § 303.6(c)(4). Asking these questions creates the record an appeal or review would need.